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1 Introduction
The strategic impact of futures markets in oligopolistic contexts has attracted
attention recently. In a Cournot duopoly, Allaz (1992) shows that, if rms can
sell in a futures market previous to the spot market, the strategic interactions
result in a more competitive outcome (in the sequel we will refer to this
model as Allazs basic model). In a later work, Allaz and Vila (1993) show
that this pro-competitive e¤ect increases as the futures markets open more
often. However, Ferreira (2003) shows that if the futures market has innitely
many moments in which trade is allowed, the result is that not only the pro-
competitive e¤ect may disappear, but that the monopolistic outcome can be
sustained in equilibrium. Taking these results together, the implications for
the design of a futures market in this context are that the market maker
must set specic (nitely many) moments to trade in the futures markets.
Hughes and Kao (1997) explore the role played by the observability of
futures positions for the result in Allaz (1992) to hold. More specically,
they take Allazs basic model and nd that, in the spirit of Bagwell (1995),
if rms do not observe each others actions in the futures market, the pro-
competitive e¤ect does not arise, and the model yields the standard Cournot
outcome. This result agrees with intuition; it is the knowledge that the
other rm observes ones commitment in the futures markets that makes
rms willing to use this market strategically. The implications for the design
of futures markets, thus, seem to favor transparency.
More recently, Mahnec and Salaniè (2004) show that, if rms compete a la
Bertrand with di¤erentiated products, the introduction of a forward market
softens competition when this market opens once before the spot market.
Hence, the design of futures markets ought to take into account the strategic
variable of the oligopolistic rms. Liski and Montero (2005) consider an
innitely repeated oligopoly where, in each period, both a futures and a spot
market are open. In the futures market rms may contract quantities for
any future spot market. In this situation, they nd that the presence of the
futures market makes collusion easier in the sense that it requires a lower
discount rate than in the case without futures market.
All previous works impose the no-arbitrage condition that futures and
spot market prices must be the same. This condition is standard and can
be easily justied. Allaz (1992) explicitly models a set of speculators who
act competitively to drive the prots to zero, resulting in equal futures and
spot prices. Hughes and Kao (1997) implicitly assume the existence of these
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speculators to justify equal futures and spot market prices. However, the
behavior of these speculators is not modeled and, thus, the model in Hughes
and Kao (1997) must be understood as model in a reduced form.
In this paper we also take Allazs basic model and study the role of
observability of positions in the futures market, but we model explicitly the
role of the speculators that trade in the futures markets. We propose a
simple futures market game in which rst rms decide how much to sell in
this market, and then competitive speculators simultaneously set a price at
which to buy those quantities. The speculator that o¤ers the highest price
buys the total quantity (up to a tie-breaking rule). In Allazs basic model
the speculators choose the level of forward purchases based on their risk
attitude. However, in our model, since speculators are risk neutral, they
will be willing to buy as much as they can if the futures price is lower than
the expected spot price. In this setting we nd that if speculators observe
perfectly rms futures positions then the result is the same as in Allazs
model when speculatorsrisk attitude tends to risk neutrality.
However, when trying to model the absence of observability, things are
far from trivial. In our model, the knowledge of the speculators may be
transmitted to the rms through the equilibrium price in the futures mar-
ket. Hence we need to assume that speculators do not observe total futures
market quantities in order to have imperfectly informed rms. With this
new assumption we nd that the conclusion in Hughes and Kao (1997) may
not follow, i.e., that the equilibrium does not necessarily imply a reversal to
the Cournot outcome. In fact, both the Cournot and the competitive out-
comes are sustained in equilibrium. However, only the competitive outcome
looks reasonable after certain stability considerations are added. The reason
is that now rms take advantage of the speculatorslack of knowledge and
sell as much as they can in the futures market if the equilibrium price in
this market is above the competitive equilibrium. Being anticipated, this
behavior can only lead to the competitive price in equilibrium. However, we
do not read this result as a case for opaque futures markets (at least not
yet), as the assumption of total ignorance of positions in the futures market
is clearly an extreme one. Rather, this result says that Hughes and Kaos
reduced form may not be the only possibility to extend Allazs basic model,
and therefore that Hughes and Kaos result is not satised in general as the
role of observability may depend drastically on the way the futures markets
is organized.
Finally, we consider the case of partial observability that includes the
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previous analysis as particular cases. In this general setting we characterize
the set of prices that can be sustained in a Bayesian perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies for some knowledge structure. If we rule out the extreme case
in which positions are not observed (when we get the competitive price), we
nd that this set of prices is bounded away from the competitive price, and
that it has the price in Allazs basic model as a maximum.
In the absence of other reasons for using futures markets, the conclusion
for designing futures markets thus seem to favor opacity, but only as long as
it is possible to make speculators at least partially ignorant of total quantities
in this market. If speculators know these quantities, futures prices will be
informative regardless of the opacity of this market, and the decision on
transparency versus opacity must be taken based on other grounds.
In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3 we present the mod-
els for di¤erent assumptions on observability. Section 4 presents a discussion
and Section 5 concludes. Figures are provided at the end.
2 The basic model and the extreme cases
2.1 Case 1. Allazs basic model
Consider a duopoly where rms produce a homogeneous good at zero costs
and compete a la Cournot in a market where demand is given by p = A q if
q  A, and p = 0 if q > A. Suppose that before producing and selling in the
spot market, rms may sell in advance part of their production in a futures
market. Denote by si and fi the quantities sold by rm i in the spot and
futures market, respectively, and write qi = si+ fi, with q = q1+ q2: Assume
that (f1; f2) are observed when rms sell in the spot market. A strategy
for rm i is a pair (fi; si (f1; f2)) : Finally, let us introduce a no-arbitrage
condition that requires that both futures and spot prices be the same. The
game tree is depicted in Figure 1.
Firmspayo¤s are i = p (fi + si). This game corresponds to the model
in Allaz and Vila (1993) when there is only one period to sell in the futures
market. It also corresponds to the model in Allaz (1992) when rms are risk
neutral, and where a no-arbitrage condition substitutes the speculators.
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in non-weakly dominated
strategies is readily calculated backwards. If positions in the futures market
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are observable, given f1 and f2, in the spot market rm i solves:
max
si
psi
s.t p = A  f1   f2   s1   s2
The solution gives the reaction function si =
A f1 f2 sj
2
or, in terms of
total quantities, qi =
A+fi qj
2
. Solving for s1 and s2, one nds si =
A f1 f2
3
,
qi =
A+2fi fj
3
, and p = A f1 f2
3
.
Knowing this reaction, rmsposition in the futures market is calculated
as follows:
max
fi
p (fi + si) (1)
s.t si = p =
A  f1   f2
3
The solution to this problem is fi =
A fj
4
. Solving for f1 and f2, and
substituting in the expressions for the other variables, the result is fi = p =
si =
A
5
, qi = 25A, with prots given by i =
2
25
A2. The equilibrium is
thus showing a pro-competitive e¤ect of the futures market as the Cournot
equilibrium without it (f1 = f2 = 0) is qi = p = A3 , with i =
A2
9
. To
understand why this occurs, notice that if, for whatever reason, it is known
that Firm 2 does not use the futures market, then Firm 1 chooses f2 = A4
and then it follows that p = si = A4 , q1 =
1
2
A, q2 = 14A. The pro-competitive
e¤ect is caused as rms strategically commit some production level in order
to change the Cournot game they play on the spot market.
The strategy proles in which q1, q2  A are also SPE, but with rms
playing dominated strategies. Instead of ruling out dominated strategies, we
could have introduced a production cost (as in Allaz and Vila, 93), but this
option has the consequence of making the analysis in Section 3 far more com-
plicated. Likewise, we have assumed that rms can only take a short position
in the futures markets. A long position by Firm i is implied by a negative
value of fi. In this section, as well as in the next, all equilibria that come
after interior solutions to the rmsmaximization problems include non neg-
ative forward positions. Nevertheless, to simplify matters in equilibria after
corner solutions, we will keep this assumption in the sequel. If contracted
quantities in the futures markets are physical deliveries that take place at
the spot market opening, then it is natural that producers cannot take long
positions.
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2.2 Case 2. The result in Hughes and Kao
Hughes and Kao (1997) consider Allazs basic model and show that when
rmsfutures positions are not observed, the introduction of a futures market
has no impact. To see this, consider the same model as before, and assume
that quantity fi is not observed by rm j 6= i; (in particular, the futures
market price is not observed). A strategy for rm i is now a pair (fi; si (fi)),
and payo¤s are i = p (fi + si). As before, and following Hughes and Kao
(1997), the no-arbitrage condition is imposed. The game tree is depicted in
Figure 2.
The next proposition shows the only Bayesian perfect equilibrium (BPE)
of this game in non-dominated strategies. The presentation of the model and
the proof are somewhat di¤erent from those in Hughes and Kao (1997), but
the results and the arguments are essentially the same.
Proposition 1 Consider the game in Figure 2, with payo¤s as described
before. Then, the only BPE in which players use non-dominated strategies
is the following: Firm i chooses fi = 0; and si =
A fi
3
, and Firm i believes
with probability one that it is in the node after fj = 0.
Proof. First show that the strategy is indeed a BPE. In the equilibrium
rms are playing the Cournot outcome, with prots given by i = A
2
9
: Stan-
dard Cournot analysis shows that there is no protable deviation from si.
To check that there is no protable deviation from fi = 0 consider f 0i > 0,
while fj = 0. After this deviation si changes to s0i =
A 2f 0i
3
, p to p0 = A f
0
i
3
,
and i to 0i =
A f 0i
3

A 2f 0i
3
+ f 0i

=
A2 (f 0i)
2
9
< A
2
9
.
To show that the BPE is unique consider any other strategy (f1; f2) in
which one rm, say i, chooses fi > 0. Again, Cournot analysis in the second
stage indicates that, in equilibrium, s1 = s2 =
A f1 f2
3
: Suppose now that,
instead of fi, rm i plays f 0i . After positions (f
0
i ; fj), the other variables
take values s0i =
A 2f 0i+fi fj
3
, p = A   s0i   sj   f 0i   fj = A f
0
i fj
3
, and
0i =
A f 0i fj
3
A+f 0i+fi fj
3
. In the last expression observe that, for every initial
fi, prots achieve a unique maximum at f 0i =
fi
2
. This means that the only
case with no protable deviations is fi = 0. The equilibria in dominated
strategies are similar to those in Case 1.
This result shows that rms are unable to commit unless their futures
positions are observable. Observability is therefore a necessary condition to
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obtain the pro-competitive e¤ect of futures markets. As we shall see, when
the futures market is modeled in more detail, this conclusion does not hold
in general.
3 A model with speculators
In this section we study the role of observability in more detail. Hughes and
Kao (1997) suggest that the pro-competitive e¤ect of a futures market found
by Allaz (1992) arises only if positions in the futures market are observed, and
that if they are not, the equilibrium outcome reverts to Cournot. However,
Hughes and Kaos result is based on two implicit assumptions. The rst one is
a strong version of the no-arbitrage condition: the price in the futures market
must be the same as in the spot market in every contingency. This means
that the two prices have to coincide, not only along the equilibrium path, but
also along deviations from the equilibrium. The second assumption is that
rms do not observe prices in the futures market. Firms detect deviations
only when they produce and sell in the spot market. Let us discuss these
assumptions in more detail.
(i) The strong no-arbitrage condition. It is most natural to require that, in
equilibrium, futures and spot prices must be the same. If not, some specula-
tor can prot from buying in one market and selling in the other. Arbitrage
opportunities exist unless prices are identical. Take, then, an equilibrium
situation in which the no-arbitrage condition is satised, and consider the
consequences of a rm deviating by selling a larger quantity in the futures
market. This implies an increase in the total quantity sold in the aggregation
of both markets, and a lower price in the spot market. Should this imply also
a lower (and identical) price in the futures market? If agents have perfect
information of what is going on in the futures market, this seems the only
reasonable consequence. On the other hand, if agents in the futures market
do not have perfect information, they may not detect deviations (or, at least,
the exact size of them), and the price in the futures market may not reect
the price that will prevail in the spot market, where Cournot competition in
the residual demand (after discounting futures sales) reveals the spot price.
The existence of an agent that can foresee this di¤erence in prices may not be
the only natural assumption. In order for the futures price to reect the new
quantity, the deviation must be anticipated. However, there are two reasons
why this may not be the case. First, once a strategy prole is considered
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as an equilibrium candidate, there may be more than one possible deviation
to anticipate. How do agents know which one is actually taking place to
adjust the price? Second, the protability of a deviation may depend on the
reaction of other agents, and, then, on the price induced by the deviation.
These considerations call for a detailed model linking deviations with prices.
(ii) Observability of prices in the futures market. In the case where agents
have perfect information about quantities sold in the futures market it is hard
to justify that rms may not know about them. After all, by selling a small
quantity in the futures market, any rm may enter the market and know the
price, and a fortiori, the quantities sold. Therefore, if one wants a model
in which rms are not fully aware of quantities sold in the futures market
(out of the equilibrium path) then one also needs to have that speculators
are not fully informed either. Understanding these issues requires modeling
how agents and rms gather information.
From the discussion above, at least three possibilities arise:
Case 1. Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and
rms observe quantities (or prices) in the futures market (Allaz, 92).
Case 2. Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, but
rms do not observe prices or quantities in the futures market (Hughes and
Kao, 97), and
Case 3. Future and spot market prices coincide along the equilibrium path
and rms observe prices, but not quantities in the futures market.
In the previous section we presented game forms for cases 1 and 2. Next
we present explicit game forms representing subcases of Case 3, which deals
with a weaker version of the no-arbitrage condition and opens up new possi-
bilities, depending of how deviations from equilibrium are observed and how
they a¤ect the price in the futures market. The di¤erences in the game form
highlights the merits of each one of the cases. In particular, cases 1 and 2
do not explicitly model the demand side of the futures market, while Case
3 does. Furthermore, in Case 3, the arbitrage condition is a consequence of
the equilibrium itself, not an assumption, as in cases 1 and 2. In Subcase
3.1 below (Proposition 2) in which rms do not observe quantities in the
futures market our result is equivalent to that in Case 1 as the price in the
futures market is fully informative. However it is remarkable that Subcase
3.2 (Proposition 3) in which rms observe futures prices that are not infor-
mative is very di¤erent to Case 2, and yields a reversal to perfect competition
rather than to Cournot. Subsection 3.3 analyzes the general case of imperfect
observability.
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3.1 Weak version of the no-arbitrage condition: f1+ f2
observed by speculators.
In the previous cases prices in the futures market were automatically set
equal to spot market prices. To introduce prices in the futures market as
an independent variable, we add new players that select these prices. The
new game is as follows. In a rst stage rms simultaneously decide positions
in the futures market (f1 and f2). In the second stage, and after observing
the actions in the rst stage, n speculators simultaneously o¤er a price at
which to buy the total quantity f1 + f2. If Speculator j o¤ers the high-
est price (say pj) she buys all future quantities and makes prots given by
j = (ps   pf ) (f1 + f2), where ps is the price in the spot market. In this
case, the futures price is pf = pj. If the highest price (and, then, futures
price) pf is o¤ered by m speculators, each one of them buys 1m of the fu-
tures quantities and has prots given by j = (ps   pf ) f1+f2m . Note that,
under these conditions, speculators behave competitively (like in a standard
Bertrand model). In the third stage, and after observing prices in the futures
market, rms sell in the spot market. Since we are interested in the role of
observability in the futures market, we keep things simple in the spot market
in the sense that, as in the previous models, rms compete for the residual
demand, which is obtained after substracting the forward positions. In other
words, we assume that speculators play no role (behave competitively) in
the spot market. The game is depicted in Figure 3 where, for simplicity,
only two speculators are shown. Nodes a1; a2; a3 and a4 belong to di¤erent
information sets of Speculator 1. Similarly nodes

bk
	
k
(alt.

ck
	
k
,

dk
	
k
)
belong to di¤erent information sets of Speculator 2 (alt. Firm 1, Firm 2). A
strategy for Speculator j is a function pj (f1 + f2). A strategy for Firm i is
a pair (fi; si (fi; pf )).
The payo¤s for the rms are calculated as i = pffi+ pssi. A speculator
is to be understood as an agent that can make a potential prot from buying
in one market and selling in another one at a higher price. The demand in
the futures market is thus created if the spot price is expected to be higher
than the price in the futures market. Proposition 2 shows that this case is
equivalent to Case 1. As mentioned before, the reason is that futures prices
are fully informative of the futures positions (because speculators are fully
informed of the quantities sold in this market).
Proposition 2 Consider the game in Figure 3 with payo¤s as described
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above. Then, in all Bayesian perfect equilibria rms sell f1 = f2 = A5 in
their rst move, speculators set prices p1 = ::: = pn =
A f1 f2
3
, and rms sell
s1 = s2 = max fp1; :::; png in the spot market.
Proof. In the third stage rms are playing the Cournot outcome, s1 = s2 =
A f1 f2
3
, which implies ps =
A f1 f2
3
, and therefore, will not deviate from it.
Knowing this, in the second stage, speculators will choose pj = ps =
A f1 f2
3
as the only possibility in equilibrium. In the rst stage, rms must solve
(1), as in Case 1, to nd their best reply at this stage. The solution gives
f1 = f2 =
A
5
. To see that the equilibrium is unique notice that, in the
third stage rms are playing the unique equilibrium strategy, speculators
will deviate from strategies that do not imply p1 = p2 =
A f1 f2
3
, and that
the solution to rmsmaximization problem in the rst stage is unique.
3.2 Weak version of the no-arbitrage condition: f1+ f2
not observed by speculators.
We have just seen that the introduction of informed speculators does not
make any di¤erence with respect to the situation without speculators, but
with informed rms, as the price perfectly reects the information. Next we
show that the introduction of uninformed speculators is not equivalent to the
model without speculators and with uninformed rms. We start by looking
at the extreme case, opposite to Case 3.1 above where f1+ f2 is observed, in
which buyers in the futures market do not observe total positions in this mar-
ket, i.e., we have a game as before, except that speculators cannot condition
their actions (p1; :::; pn) on the quantity f1 + f2. In the next subsection, we
will consider a general case that includes 3.1 and 3.2 as subcases. We chose to
present the extreme cases rst to facilitate the discussion. The game form is
the same as in Figure 3, except that now nodes

ak
	
k
(

bk
	
k
) belong to the
same information set of Speculator 1 (2). Finally, fc1; c2g 2 u1, fc3; c4g 2 v1,
fd1; d3g 2 u2 and fd2; d4g 2 v2, where ui and vi are di¤erent information sets
of Firm i.
The key feature of this game is that the demand in the futures market
does not react to rmsdeviations. This opens the possibility for di¤erent
prices in the two markets as a result of deviations. The lack of information in
the model does not allow arbitrage between them. However, in equilibrium,
both prices have to coincide since the equilibrium must be anticipated by all
players in the game.
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Proposition 3 shows that, in this setting, both the competitive and Cournot
outcomes can be obtained. However we will see that only the competitive
outcome satises certain equilibrium selection criteria.
Proposition 3 In the game dened above there are two types of Bayesian
perfect equilibria: (i) rms choose f1  A; f2  A, and s1 = s2 = 0, and (ii)
rms choose f1 = f2 = 0; and s1 = s2 = A3 :
Proof. (i) First nd an equilibrium with ps = pf . Cournot behavior in the
spot market implies s1 = s2 = ps. Now see that in equilibrium ps = pf = 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that pf = ps = A   s1   s2   f1   f2 > 0. In this
situation, if Firm i increases its future positions by fi its prots increase
by fi  pf . Even if fi implies that ps decreases, fi  pf can be made
arbitrarily large and, thus, the deviation is protable.
To show that f1  A; f2  A consider rst the case where fj < A; but still
f1+ f2  A (implying pf = 0), and consider, further, that Firm i deviates to
f 0i = 0. This deviation does not change the futures price (pf = 0), as it is not
observed by speculators. Now rm i can sell si =
A fj
2
with the consequence
of ps =
A fj
2
, and prots i =

A fj
2
2
> 0. Finally, if f1 + f2 < A,
standard Cournot analysis implies s1 = s2 = ps > 0 in equilibrium, in
contradiction with the already established result that s1 = s2 = ps = 0:
Hence, the equilibrium requires f1  A; f2  A, ps = pj = si = 0. It is
straightforward to check that this is indeed an equilibrium as prots are zero
regardless of unilateral deviations.
(ii) The only possibility for an equilibrium with ps 6= pf requires that
pf = 0. As in (i), pf > 0 makes any rm willing to sell as much as possible
in the futures market. Also, pf = 0 is only possible if speculators cannot
prot by buying in the futures market to sell in the spot market, and this
can only happen if F = f1 + f2 = 0 (no one is selling in the futures market.)
Once F = 0 is established, the standard Cournot equilibrium must follow in
the spot market. Firms do not want to deviate from fi = 0 to f 0i > 0 as this
implies no prots in the futures market and will decrease prots to A fi
0
3
in
the spot market.
Notice that only equilibria of type (i) satisfy the weak version of no-
arbitrage. The no-arbitrage condition is not a behavioral imposition but it
is rather a consequence of the equilibrium. Equilibrium (ii) does not satisfy
the no-arbitrage condition because nothing is sold in the futures market.
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It turns out that the fact that equilibrium (ii) does not satisfy the weak
version of no-arbitrage makes it a less likely equilibrium. First we construct
an intuitive argument to support this claim. Then we connect it to the liter-
ature of equilibrium selection. In Section 4.4, when discussing risk aversion,
we provide one more reason to rule out the equilibrium in (ii)1.
One of the rst things to highlight in this case is not only that speculators
observe nothing about quantities o¤ered in the futures market, but that
the winner is forced to buy any quantity at the quoted price. With these
premises it should not come as a surprise that rms will sell a high quantity
in the futures market at any positive price. Being aware of this behavior,
speculators choose pj = 0 in both types of equilibria.
To understand why equilibrium (ii) is not reasonable consider again the
strategy consisting of not selling in the futures market and selling the Cournot
quantity in the spot market. Speculatorsbest reply correspondence contains
all possible prices (prots are zero in all cases), in particular, it contains
pj = 0, which, together with f1+ f2 = 0; drives the equilibrium. If there is a
small possibility that speculators choose pj = " > 0 (e.g., by mistake), rms
will anticipate prots by entering the futures market and o¤er a positive
quantity in this market. A large enough quantity will even compensate for
any cost to enter in this market.
The concept of stable set of equilibria in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)
actually rules out equilibrium (ii) on these grounds. More technically, this
particular perturbation of speculatorschoices has no equilibrium that is close
to equilibrium (ii), as fi = 0 cannot be a best reply for rms. Equilibria in
(i), on the other hand, are stable as any perturbation on the way players
choose have equilibria close to them.
Nevertheless, as we will see next, this is a very extreme and peculiar case
of a more general and interesting one, where the issues discussed here are not
relevant.
3.3 A general case: f1 + f2 observed imperfectly by
speculators.
In Case 3.1, speculators observed perfectly rmsfutures positions, whereas
in Case 3.2 they did not observe them. In this section we model a situa-
1I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the existence of equilibrium (ii) and for
suggesting the argument in Section 4.4.
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tion of partial observability, in which speculators only observe whether total
quantities in the futures market belong to a certain information set.
In the rst stage rms choose simultaneously quantities f1 and f2 within
the interval

0; B
2

, where B
2
> A. Setting an upper bound to the quantities
rms may sell only prevents us from considering subgames in which futures
positions are innite. Consider the set of partitions on the interval [0; B]
in which sets are either intervals of length of at least a pre-xed  > 0
or real numbers. When the set is an interval, it will be called an interval
of uncertainty. Denote this set of partitions by U. Given F = f1 + f2,
in the second stage Speculator js information partition is a set Uj  U.
These assumptions imply that speculators observe F or, at least, are able to
determine that F is in a certain interval of uncertainty. All speculators have
the same information partition on futures quantities; i.e., for all j, Uj = U .
Speculators choose prices contingent on information sets. In the third stage
rms observe prices set by speculators and decide s1 and s2. Prots are
calculated as in the previous cases.
The game form is the same as in Figure 3 except that now nodes belong to
the same information set of a given player according to the stated condition
(recall that a rm always knows its own past actions). Case 3.1 is the limit of
this general case when speculatorsinformation partition gets ner, and Case
3.2 corresponds to the situation in which speculatorsinformation partition
has only one information set containing all nodes such that f1 + f2 2 [0; B].
Denote by p the price in the spot and futures markets when both coin-
cide. Proposition 4 shows that the range of prices that can be obtained with
di¤erent levels of partial observability is A
6
 p  A
5
(in addition to p = 0 and
ps =
A
3
). Recall that p = A
5
is the price obtained with perfect observability.
The intuition is the same as in Proposition 3: speculators know that the im-
perfect observability of futures positions induce rms to increase their sales
in the futures markets to take advantage of a high price. The size of this
increase depends on the precise information structure. In any case, specula-
tors know that rms will produce too much and anticipate lower prices with
imperfect observability. For very low prices (lower than A
6
), however, devia-
tions are no longer benecial for the rms because the gains in the futures
market do not compensate for the losses in the spot market.
The case of p = 0 is explained because of the discontinuity of the demand
function at this point, which allows for arbitrary deviations when the lack of
observability is absolute. Finally, the case of ps = A3 occurs because of the
discontinuity of speculatorsbest reply (they may set pf = 0 at F = 0, but
12
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pf =
A F
3
if F is very small), and only in a non-stable equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the game described above the only prices that can be sus-
tained in a BPE in pure strategies with an information partition U  U are
p = 0, ps = A3 and
A
6
 p  A
5
.
Proof. Propositions 2 and 3 already show that p = 0, p = A
3
and p = A
5
can
be sustained in a BPE; only notice that speculatorsinformation sets are in
U: The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that the only other prices
that can be sustained in equilibrium are A
6
 p < A
5
. Recall that to sustain
a price p > 0 in a BPE, the required total quantity must be q = A  p, and
also that the spot quantities must satisfy s1 = s2 = p. Total futures positions
compatible with these conditions require f1+f2 = F = q s1 s2 = A 3p or
p = A F
3
. To sustain p take f1 > 0 and f2 > 0 such that F = f1+f2 = A 3p.
In a BPE speculators must assign probability 1 to the total quantity F ,
and o¤er prices pj = p: If rms choose f1 and f2; Firm ones prots are
1 = p (f1 + s1) =
A f1 f2
3
A+2f1 f2
3
: To consider possible deviations from the
proposed scenario we need to distinguish several cases. Given the structure
of information sets, it is straightforward to see that there are only three
possibilities for F :
(i) F 2 u for some interval u 2 U . (F cannot be known with certainty.)
(ii) F 2 U and all points in a neighborhood of T are also elements of U .
(F and a neighborhood around it can be known with certainty.)
(iii) F 2 U and is the frontier of an interval u 2 U such that F =2 u. (F can
be known with certainty, but is in the frontier of an interval of uncertainty.)
(i) Consider rm ones deviation to (f 01; s
0
1) with f
0
1 + f2 belonging to
the same information set as F , and with s01 being derived from the reaction
function s01 =
A f 01 f2 s2
2
. Because speculators do not observe the deviation,
the futures price does not change along the equilibrium path: i.e., for all
j 2 N , pj = A f1 f23 . Because the price in the futures market does not
change, Firm 2 does not change its spot quantity along the equilibrium path,
thus s2 =
A f1 f2
3
, and then s01 =
2A 3f 01 2f2+f1
6
. The spot price, however,
changes to p0 = A  f 01  f2  s01  s2 = 2A 3f
0
1 2f2+f1
6
= s01 as Firm 1 changed
its quantities in both the forward and spot markets. Then Firm 1s prots
are given by 01 =
A f1 f2
3
f 01 +

2A 3f 01 2f2+f1
6
2
. The di¤erence in prots is
01   1 = 14 (f 01   f1)2. This di¤erence is positive for any f 01 6= f1 such that
f 01+f2 belong to the same information set as F for speculators, which means
that no equilibrium exists in this case.
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(ii) A deviation to f 01 within a neighborhood of f1 gives prots 
0
1 =
A f 01 f2
3
A+2f 01 f2
3
: The di¤erence in prots is now given by the expression
01   1 = 19 (f 01   f1) (A  2f 01   2f1   f2). If A   4f1   f2 > 0, take f 01 =
f1 + ", with " > 0 small enough, to get 01   1 > 0. If A   4f1   f2 < 0,
take f 01 = f1   ".
(iii) There are four relevant cases. (iii.a) A  4f1   f2 < 0 and f1 + f2 is
located at the left end of an interval of uncertainty (open to the left), (iii.b)
A   4f1   f2 > 0 and f1 + f2 is located at the right end of an interval of
uncertainty (open to the right), (iii.c) A  4f1  f2 > 0 and f1+ f2 is located
at the left end of an interval of uncertainty, (iii.d) A   4f1   f2 < 0 and
f1 + f2 is located at the right end of an interval of uncertainty. The cases
when A   4f1   f2 = 0 and A   4f2   f1 = 0 are solved like in Proposition
2 and give p = A
5
in equilibrium. In the rst two cases, the deviation is
perfectly observed, in Case (iii.a) repeat Case (ii) with f 01 = f1 + ", and in
(iii.b) repeat (ii) with f 01 = f1   " to conclude that there are no equilibria.
For the other two cases, (iii.c) and (iii.d), notice that if futures positions
are not perfectly observed after the deviation, speculators will o¤er a price
p0, their contingent price for the information set induced by Firm 1. The
new prots for Firm 1 are given by 0 = p0f 01+

A f 01 f2 p0
2
2
. In Case (iii.c)
p0 < A f1 f2
3
and the maximum for this expression restricted to f 01  f1
corresponds to f 01 = f1: This implies that if Firm 1 deviates from f1 to
induce p0, it had better do it with a very small deviation. I.e., f 01 = f1 + "
for a small " > 0. The gain in prots are (except for terms in ") 0    =
1
36
(5A  17f1   5f2   3p0) (A  f1   f2   3p0). The expression in the second
parenthesis is positive. The expression in the rst parenthesis attains its
inmum with respect to p0, and restricted to p0 < A f1 f2
3
at p0 = A f1 f2
3
:
This inmum is 4 (A  3f1   f2) > 0 if A  4f1   f2 > 0, as required in this
case. In Case (iii.d) p0 > A f1 f2
3
, and the maximum of 0 also corresponds
to f 01 = f1; which implies that rm ones deviation should be f
0
1 = f1   ":
The expression for 0  is the same as in (iii.c). The second parenthesis is
negative, and the rst parenthesis is always non negative if A  3f1  f2  0:
By symmetry, to get that no protable deviations exist for the other rm we
have that A   4f2   f1  0 and A   3f2   f1  0. I.e., there are equilibria
as long as 2A   5f1   5f2  0 and 2A   4f1   4f2  0, which implies
4
5
A  f1 + f2  A and A6  p  A5 :
It is interesting to notice that, according to the proof of Proposition 4, the
futures quantity f1 + f2, and the information partition U  U that support
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prices p 2 A
6
; A
5

in a BPE in pure strategies satisfy one of two following
conditions:
(a) (Case iii.c in the proof) A  4f1  f2 > 0 and f1+ f2 is located at the
left end of an interval of uncertainty,
(b) (Case iii.d in the proof) A   4f1   f2 < 0 and f1 + f2 is located at
the right end of an interval of uncertainty.
4 Discussion
4.1 Market design
Our results may be sensitive to the particular way competition is modeled
in the futures market. In our model rms rst decide their futures positions,
and then speculators bid to buy these quantities. This is a standard model of
a rst-price, sealed-envelope auction or a Bertrand price-competition. Notice
that speculators know the equilibrium quantities, but may not know precisely
the quantities after a deviation occurs. Speculators are, of course, aware
of their ignorance and react to it. The equilibrium is the result of these
reactions.
Other models are possible (and even more realistic) to describe the fu-
tures market. For instance, if rms are allowed to sell in the futures market
with a positive reservation price (meaning that if the price is zero no trade
takes place), then, no matter how close to zero is this reservation price, the
strategy of fi = 0 is dominated. But then, speculators may also have the
possibility of buying only a limited quantity in the futures market. These
alternatives may rule out some of the extreme cases, but open the possibility
for more complicated supply and demand schedules as strategy choices, and
will greatly complicate the model.
The present work makes the point that it is precisely the study of these
alternatives that, in the end, will tell us about the role of observability in
the futures markets. In this work we did not attempt to provide a detailed
study of di¤erent institutional designs of futures markets. Rather we provide
the rst model that, to our knowledge, considers partial observability in the
futures market, and explicitly takes into account the behavior of all agents
in this market. Furthermore, we have shown that, by doing this, our ndings
are di¤erent from the ones found in the reduced form models studied in the
literature.
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Having said this, and admitting it is too early to derive recommendations
for the design of futures markets in oligopolistic industries without further
studies, it may still be worthwhile to provide a sketch of the design of a
market that conforms with the assumptions in this paper.
First, the transparency of the futures markets is not required to promote
competition. In fact, transparency may make collusion easier to implement
as deviations can be monitored. Opacity, on the other hand, can promote
competition if speculators are not informed of total quantities (if they are
informed, the result is the same as with a transparent market). The question
is, then, how to design a market that invites the participation of speculators
without giving them any information. A literal reading of the model would
require that the futures markets opens only once, and that the market takes
the form of an auction where the auctioneer collected bids, in the form of
price per unit, for an unknown quantity. The speculator that submitted the
highest bid would be forced to buy the whole quantity.
Here we suggest a more realistic possibility. Given that there is an upper
bound to what rms can sell in the futures market, say A, the auctioneer
divides A in k lots of size a = A=k: Of course, if the total quantity is q;
with l  q=a  l + 1, there will be l lots with a quantity of a, one lot with
quantity q  la, and k  l lots of quantity zero. All this is common knowledge.
Then a rst-price, sealed-envelope auction takes place for each one these lots.
Participants in the auctions (speculators) decide in which of the auctions to
participate, but there will be no information about q or l; or about the size
of a particular lot. To spread speculators over all lots, a limited number of
bidders for each lot could be set. All auctions take place simultaneously,
and the actual quantity of each lot (qj 2 fa; q   la; 0g, j = 1; :::l) is revealed
after the winner is proclaimed. The winner of lot j buys the total quantity
qj. Given that the demand is completely elastic at the anticipated futures
price, pf , each of the auctions will give pf as the equilibrium price. (This is
not true in models where the demand is not perfectly elastic.)
This type of auction has some resemblances with Treasury auctions, where
it has been shown that rst price auctions may be more e¢ cient than second-
price auctions.
4.2 Market microstructure
There is a large literature on Market Microstructure Theory (see OHara
(1995) and references within) studying the exchange of assets under explicit
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trading rules. One of the approaches in this literature takes the form of
information-based models, where the trading process is viewed as a game in-
volving traders with asymmetric information. However, we are not aware of
any work in which intermediaries have an information structure comparable
to the one we develope here. Furthermore, the source of asymmetric infor-
mation in the Theory of Market Microstructure is usually the assets true
value. The present work suggests that the value of the asset itself may be
a¤ected by the traders decisions, as the value of a futures position depends
on the quantities sold by any of the rms in the futures market. The reason
lies, of course, in the oligopolistic structure of the underlying spot market.
Thus we can see the present work as a motivation for a possible extension of
the models in Market Microstructure Theory.
Even if the sources for asymmetric information are di¤erent, it is inter-
esting to note that the literature on market microstructure has found that
more transparency is not always better in terms of e¢ ciency. See Madhavan
(2000).
4.3 Speculatorsinformation
In the general model, all speculators have the same information about futures
quantities. However, we can extend the results to the case where specula-
tors may have di¤erent information partitions (e.g., because they observed
di¤erent private signals). To see this, consider Speculator js information
partition, Uj, and dene bU as the union of all partitions Uj (j 2 f1; :::ng):
The possibilities for total future quantities F are now:
(i) F 2 u for some interval u 2 bU . (F cannot be known with certainty
by any speculator.)
(ii) F 2 bU and all points in a neighborhood of T are also elements ofbU . (F and a neighborhood around it can be known with certainty by some
speculator.) And
(iii) F 2 bU and is the frontier of an interval u 2 bU such that F =2 u. (F
can be known with certainty by some speculator, but is in the frontier of an
interval of uncertainty of all speculators.)
One can now rewrite Proposition 4. The existence of no equilibrium in
Case (i) is shown as in Case (i). In Case (ii), the deviation f 0 is observed by
some speculators, which may or may not change future prices (because the
new price o¤ered by theses speculators may or may not be lower than the
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price set by the others). If the futures market price changes, the argument
is the same as in Case (ii) in the proposition, if it does not change, we argue
as in Case (i). The same argument works for Case (iii).
4.4 Risk aversion
Except for equilibrium (ii) in Case 3.2, all of the results are robust to small
departures from the specication of the model (linear and certain demand,
and risk neutral rms). If rms are risk averse and demand is uncertain,
equilibrium (ii) can no longer exist because risk averse rms have a strong
reason to enter the futures market (to reduce risk). This means that pj = 0
cannot be an equilibrium in this market unless the price in the spot market is
also zero. Thus, risk aversion provides another argument against the Cournot
outcome if positions in the futures market are not observed (not even by
speculators).
It is interesting to note the similarity between this situation and the
resolution of the famous Grossman-Stiglitz paradox (Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980)) also in the context of futures contracts (with asymmetric information
about the real value of the asset): if price reveals all private information, and
can be observed costlessly, then there will be no incentive to gather costly
private information. But then no private information will be revealed, and
there will be an incentive to gather it. Grossman himself had argued that the
addition of a suitable source of noise would avoid the paradox, but as Bray
(1992) observes, all one requires is that there exists some hedging motive
for trading the asset. In our context, the Cournot outcome occurs if no one
enters the futures market, which allows for a zero price in this market (or any
other). At a zero price there is no incentive to enter the market. If mistakes
are added the zero price disappears, but this addition is not necessary as the
existence of uncertainty and of risk averse rms may be enough to rule out
the zero price.
4.5 Opacity versus transparency
According to Hughes and Kao (1997) rms perform better in a situation in
which the futures market is opaque (they get the Cournot prots) than when
it is transparent (they get the outcome found in Allaz, 1992). This means
that, given the choice, they prefer an opaque market. However, if both types
of markets are present, then rms face a prisonersdilemma, as they have an
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incentive to use the transparent market to get a higher market share. Our
model, however, indicates that, if the demand side of the futures market is
sensitive enough in the sense of setting prices that reect actual quantities,
the observability of futures quantities by rms does not make any di¤erence.
Therefore, rms will be indi¤erent if given the choice between the two types of
markets. On the other hand, if prices in the futures market are not sensitive
to changes in quantities, a more competitive outcome may result. In this
case rms prefer the transparent market and to face no prisonersdilemma.
The liberalization of the power market in England and Wales provides an
interesting case. In this industry there were two futures markets: Contracts
for Di¤erences (CfD) and Electricity Forward Agreements (EFA), where the
CfD is much more opaque. According to estimates in Power UK (1997 and
1998), around 1998 the coverture of the CfDs was nearly 90% of the market,
while the EFAs accounted for less than 30%. This contradicts the conclusions
of Hughes and Kao (1997), but not ours if prices are informative. Of course,
our model does not explain the fact that rms prefer the opaque market,
but is compatible with these preferences if there are reasons that justify
them. For example, rms may show a collusive behavior that may be better
implemented in real life in the more opaque market. This possibility has
been suggested in Powel et al. (1994).
5 Conclusion
Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that, if a futures market is
added to the spot market in an oligopolistic industry, rms show a more
competitive behavior. Hughs and Kao (1997) argue that rms must have
perfect information about futures quantities for this result to hold, and that
without this information rms behave as in Cournot. We show that while
perfect information leads to the result in Allaz and Vila (1993), the imperfect
information may not lead to Cournot, but to a more competitive outcome.
If the demand side in the futures market is informed, the fact that rms are
not informed is irrelevant, as prices reveal the information. This later case
provides a theoretical model for the observed behavior in the futures markets
of the UK power industry, which contradicts the results in Hughs and Kao
(1997). Our model suggests that the microstructure of the futures markets
needs to be studied with more care, and that the conclusions obtained in a
reduced form of the market may not be compelling.
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